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Abstract
Decisionmakers who confront a long sequence of criminal opportunities act
differently from those who confront a single opportunity. If the sequence is long enough,
people will take big chances in return for very small gains, even if the probability of
detection is very great and the scale of punishment very large. Risk neutral people will
appear to love risk. For long enough sequences of future opportunities, raising the
probability of detection increases the amount of crime committed, rather than lowering it.
Constitutional safeguards are an important deterrent to crime.
People are often presented with opportunities to commit crimes. In assessing each
opportunity, they need to consider the past, the present, and the future ~ the crimes they
have already committed, the opportunity at hand, and the crimes they are likely to
commit. Decision-making in this context is different from decision-making when a single
criminal opportunity is being analyzed in isolation ~ the sort of problem Becker (1968)
studied. In this paper I show how it is different.
In particular, if the sequence of future opportunities is long enough, rational
people will take big chances in return for very small gains, even if the probability of
detection is very great and the scale of punishment very large. Risk neutral people will
appear to be risk-loving. For long enough sequences of future opportunities, raising the
probability of detection increases the amount of crime committed, rather than lowering it.
For sequences of any length, increases in the probability that an innocent person will go
free reduce crime by more than equivalent increases in the probability that a guilty person
will be punished, and as the length of the sequence grows this difference grows.
Constitutional safeguards ~ "coddling criminals," in today's political parlance ~ are thus
an important deterrent to crime. In the traditional one-shot model, convicting wrongly is
just as bad for deterrent purposes as acquitting wrongly (see, for instance Schrag &
Scotchmer 1994); but as the horizon over which potential criminals plan grows longer,
convicting wrongly becomes ever worse in its consequences. Deontology and long-run
consequentialism agree.
The intuition behind these results lies in the notion of fatalism. Kremer (1996)
and Mahal and O'Flaherty (1997) discuss how fatalism affects decisions to engage in
behavior that could cause AIDS. If an injecting drug user, for instance, believes that
sometime in the future the temptation to use an infected needle will be so large that he
will give in and contract AIDS, then he might as well start using dirty needles now, since
he will be infected no matter what he does in the current period. Fatalism works in the
opposite direction of fear; thus, for instance, if fear predominates, a partially effective
vaccine encourages risky behavior while if fatalism predominates a partially effective
vaccine discourages risky behavior.
The key problem in applying the results from AIDS research to the study of
criminal behavior is that contracting AIDS is an all-or-nothing, once-in-a-lifetime event;
punishment for crimes can be more finely graded and dispersed over one's lifetime. The
timing question turns out not to be a serious problem: what we need to consider is
lifetime punishment. The gradation question is more serious: fatalism is present only if
lifetime punishment is a concave function of lifetime detected crimes. Since lifetime
punishment is bounded from above, concavity is not an unreasonable assumption.
The next section of this paper sets out the simplest model of long-term criminal
behavior, one where crimes are detected either in the same period in which they are
committed, or never. This is essentially a straightforward extension of Mahal and
O'Flaherty (1996). Section 2 derives a series of results about willingness to commit
crimes and risk aversion. Section 3 derives the ergodic distribution of potential criminals
by number of convictions. Section 4 compares the deterrence effects of increases in the
probability of correct and incorrect detection and shows the greater effectiveness of
constitutional safeguards. Section 5 shows how changes in punishment affect crime, and
section 6 concludes.
All models in this paper have infinite horizons. Mahal and O'Flaherty (1997)
show that in the study of AIDS finite horizon models are not much different from infinite
horizon ones. I therefore have omitted finite horizon extensions from this paper.
1. THE SETTING
I consider an individual decision problem. A decision-maker (DM) lives for an
infinite number of discrete periods. In each period he must decide whether to commit a
crime. The (instantaneous) payoff from abstaining from crime is zero. The
(instantaneous) payoff from committing a crime is a random variable b. This random
variable (the attractiveness of that period's criminal opportunity) is drawn independently
each period from the same distribution F(-). I assume that F(-) is atomless and its support
is the positive half-line. The DM knows the current period's value of b before he decides
whether to commit a crime, but he does not know future values.
At the end of each period, there is a constant hazard q>0 that the DM will die (or
be removed from the sequence of temptations). The DM maximizes the expected
undiscounted sum of payoffs. Note that q=\ corresponds to the one-shot case that Becker
studied.
The DM is also liable for punishment in each period, based on his choice of
activity. At the end of each period, an exogenous legal system either convicts him of a
crime or does not. If he has committed a crime, the probability that he will be punished is
(1 - a ) ; so a is the probability that a guilty party will escape punishment. If he has not
committed a crime, the probability that he will be punished is p ; so p is the probability
that an innocent person will be punished. The parameters a and p both represent
mistakes that the legal system can make. I assume
a +P <1 ;
criminal behavior increases the probability of criminal conviction. Policies that give
police and prosecutors more leeway seek to reduce a ; policies that reduce police powers
and raise the hurdles for conviction seek to reduce (3 . Since it is probably hard to reduce
a without increasing p or vice versa, I will be interested in the relative responsiveness
of criminal activity to changes in these two parameters.
In this paper I assume that the probability of conviction each period depends only
on the activities in that period. A crime that goes unpunished in the period in which it is
committed goes unpunished forever. This assumption can be relaxed without serious
changes to the results.
Punishment following a conviction depends on the number of previous
convictions. LetP
denote the lifetime punishment function: a person convicted of x crimes in his lifetime is
sentenced to a total punishment of P(x). Thus if a person who has already been
convicted of x crimes in his life is convicted of another one, the punishment he will
receive is
p(x)=P(x+\)-P(x)
I assume throughout that P(x) is a weakly increasing function of x and hence thatp(x) is
always nonnegative and sometimes positive. I will also be concerned whether P() is
bounded, convex, linear or concave. Notice that I have not restricted the domain of P()
to the integers, even though we will never encounter a DM with a fractional number of
convictions. This is for convenience; in fact I assume that/?(x) is twice differentiable.
Let B(x) denote the set of crime benefits b that will induce a DM who is behaving
optimally with x prior convictions to commit a crime.
Let V(x\q,a, P) denote the value function: V{x[) is the expected value of current
and future payoffs for a DM who has already been convicted of x crimes and acts
optimally from now on. Then the fundamental recursion equation is
(1)
The maximization in (1) is simple and obvious: a criminal opportunity b should
be taken — that is, beB(x) — if and only if the expression in curly brackets in the first
integrand is greater than the expression in curly brackets in the second integrand,
b - (1 - a)p(x) + (1 - q)[(\ -a)V(x +1) +aF(jc)]
> -P/7(JC) + (1 -4)W{x. + 1) + (1 - Wtol
So B(x) is an upper half-line with minimum b* (x|#,a, P) , where
(2) b* (x\q,a, p) = (1 - a - ?>)[p(x) + (1 - q)[V(x) - V(x +1)]].
If b > b* (x\q,a, p) the DM commits the crime; otherwise he abstains. Note that if q=\,
the DM follows the Becker one-shot rule,
We can substitute (1) into (2) and simplify in order to derive a fundamental
recursion equation for b* (-|-). Such a recursion equation is our basic interest, since the
probability of criminal behavior
\-F(b\x\q,a,?>))
is monotonically (and negatively) related to b* (•[). To do so, define the following
function:
00
G(z,y) = j[min(b,z) - y]dF(b) if z > y
y
00
= - J [min(Z>, y) - z\df(b) ifz<y.
z
Note that G(-) is continuous and differentiable in both its arguments with
(4) ,eo
dy~
Then we can simplify and write the following proposition:
Proposition 1:
(a) The minimum criminal opportunity b*(x\q,a,$) satisfies the following
recursion equation:
(5) '
(b) A unique solution to (5) exists and is continuous and differentiable in all its
arguments.
Proofs are gathered in the appendix.
2. WILLINGNESS TO COMMIT CRIMES
Proposition 1 gives the fundamental recursion equation we can use for tracing out
willingness to commit crimes. How that willingness varies with x depends on the
curvature of the lifetime punishment function P. If P is concave, then additional crimes
bring less punishment, and so willingness to commit crimes increases as the number of
convictions increases. Moreover, the cut-off is always lower than the Becker one-shot
cut-off: one gain from being convicted of a crime is that future crimes will be punished
less harshly.
Conversely, if the lifetime punishment function is convex, these results are
reversed. The cut-off b* (•[) rises as convictions increase, and is always higher than the
Becker one-shot cut-off. If the lifetime punishment function is linear, the cut-off is
independent of the number of convictions and equals the Becker one-shot cut-off.
Formally:
Proposition 2:
(a) If P(-) is concave, b*(x\q,a, P) is a decreasing function of x, and always less
than the Becker one-shot rule given by (3).
(b) If P(-) is convex, b*(x\q,a,fi) is an increasing function ofx, and always
more than the Becker one-shot rule.
(c) If P(-) is linear, b* (x\q,a, p) is constant with respect to x, and the Becker
one-shot rule holds.
Note that if punishment is bounded and concave, someone who has been
convicted of many crimes will not be much deterred by threats of punishment:
Corollary to proposition 2:
If P is concave and bounded, then
lim u*(r\n n a\ — r\
Moreover,
Proposition 3:
for all x,a, p if P is concave
Thus with convex and bounded punishment and a long enough expected sequence
of trials, any temptation is big enough to succumb to, because eventually you are likely to
be convicted enough times that this particular transgression won't matter.
What is the actual shape of punishment functions? Some provisions ~ leniency
for first offenders, for instance ~ suggest some convex portions, while others ~ "three
strikes and you're in" ~ suggest concavity. A stigma that attaches to anyone who has a
record makes the punishment function concave (see Freeman [1992] for evidence on such
a stigma). Since punishment is bounded from above, it is unlikely that punishment
functions are convex or linear, at least in their entirety. Thus concavity and boundedness
are probably the more interesting properties, especially for limit arguments.
3. THE DISTRIBUTION OF DMs BY NUMBER OF CONVICTIONS
These basic equations allow us to calculate the distribution of DMs by number of
convictions.
Consider an arbitrary number of convictions x>0, and let s(x) denote the number
(or share) of DMs who have that many convictions. DMs leave this state in two ways:
qs(x) of them die each period, and (l-q)c(x)s(x) get convicted of another crime, where
c(x) = (1 -<x)(l - F(b\x)) + p>F(b\x))
the unconditioned probability that a DM with x prior convictions will be convicted this
period. On the other hand,
(l-q)c(x-\)s(x-l)
people who had (x-1) convictions last period were convicted and so entered state x. The
steady state requires that entries equal exits and so




If punishment is concave or linear c(x -1) < c(x) and so s(x) < s(x -1). The
more convictions, the fewer the number of DMs in the steady state. If punishment is
convex, this relationship may still hold for some x, but no general statement is possible.
4. CHANGES IN CONVICTION PROBABILITIES
What happens when conviction probabilities change? I confine my attention to
concave punishment functions; results for convex ones are generally opposite.
The easiest kind of change to consider is a reduction in the probability of
wrongful conviction, p . Roughly speaking, this causes two effects, both in the same
direction. First, it means that the difference in expected convictions caused by abstaining
on this particular trial,
1-a-p
increases; so even if the punishment function were linear, there would be a greater gain
from abstention (see Schrag and Scotchmer 1994). Second, it means that given any
pattern of behavior on future trials, the number of expected lifetime convictions is less,
and so the relevant region of the punishment function is steeper. This also increases the
gain from abstention, and so both effects reduce the attractiveness of crime.
On the other hand, for reductions in a , the probability of wrongly escaping
conviction, the two effects work in opposite directions. Changing a changes ( 1 - a - p )
the same way changing p does, and so the effect on convictions from abstaining in this
period is the same. But reducing a increases, rather than reduces, the number of
10
expected future convictions, and makes the relevant range of the punishment function a
region where that function is flatter, rather than steeper. Thus whenever the punishment
function is concave, a reduction in p reduces crime more than an equal reduction in a .
This difference in effects grows as the expected number of temptations grows.
Indeed, if punishment is concave, reductions in a increase crime if the horizon is
sufficiently long. The intuition is that the second effect becomes stronger than the first.
Recall that with bounded punishment if your future number of expected convictions is
large enough you might as well start committing crimes now since current crimes will








D(x\q,a,f>) = W(x\q,a,p>)- A(x\q,a,fi),
and say "fatalism predominates at (q, x)" whenever A(x\q,a, P) > 0 (increasing the
probability of convicting a guilty person increases crime). We can restate the above
informal ideas as three propositions.
Proposition 4:
If P is concave, W(x\q,a,$) < 0 for all x,g,a,p
11
Proposition 5:
If P is concave, D(x\q,a,fi) < 0.
Proposition 6:
If P is concave, there exists a quit probability q , 1> q >0, such that for all x and
all q<q\ A(x\q,a,$) > 0.
5. CHANGES IN THE PUNISHMENT FUNCTION
The other class of policies proposed to deter crime are those that make
punishment "tougher." In the one-shot case, definition of tougher punishment is obvious
and so is the argument for its efficacy in reducing crime. For the repeated case neither
definition nor argument is so clear.
What is clear is that ifp(x) were to increase for all x, b* (x[) would, too; this
follows fairly directly from (5). But if lifetime punishment is bounded, such an across-
the-board increase is not feasible.
Consider first a change in only one value ofp(x). Implicitly such a change
changes P(x') for x'> x, but (5) shows that this change in P(x') is irrelevant for
behavior. Since b*(x +J|-) depends only onp(x) and on b*(x + k\) for higher values of &,
b* (x +1|-) does not change whenp(x) changes. Thus we can differentiate (5) with respect
to p(x) and rearrange to obtain
12
dp(x) q + (1 - q)c(x)
Note that in the one-shot Becker case
dp(x)
and so since < 1, one-shot punishment impacts are larger than punishment
impacts in the repeated decision problem. Indeed, as the horizon grows (that is, q —» 0),
the impact of changes in punishment vanishes.
Unless x=0, however, the impact of a change in punishment at x is not limited to






dp{x) q + (1 - q)c(x)
and in general
dp(x) q + (\-q)c(xy t
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for k=l,. .. Thus the effect of a change inp(x) is felt by all DMs with x or fewer
convictions, but the fewer the number of convictions the smaller the impact. All these
impacts are in the intuitive direction: punishment deters crime. (There is a curious
dichotomy here. If P(x') changes — that is, if xf> x — then behavioral incentives don't
change. If P(x') stays the same ~ that is, if x'< x ~ then behavioral incentives change.)
If there is a binding physical bound on maximum punishment, then a simple
increase in one/?(x) is impossible. Consider therefore a compound perturbation of the
punishment function; let p(x0) increase by 5 and p{xx) decrease by 8 . Changes like
this are probably the kind observed most often. The impact depends on whether xQ > xx
or not.
Suppose x0 > Xj; punishment increases after more crimes but decreases after
fewer. For x between x0 and x}, only the increase at x0 matters; thus b * (x1) increases
and crime decreases. But the effect wears off as x decreases. For x'< x,, both effects
matter, but the effect of the increase is more distant and so is less strong. So b* (x1)
decreases in this range and crime increases. So the overall effect on crime is ambiguous
and depends on the distribution of DMs by number of convictions.
Suppose x0 < Xj; punishment decreases after more crimes, but increases after
fewer. An example would be "three strikes and you're in." The pattern is the opposite.
For x between x0 and x,, crime increases; for x'< x0, crime decreases. Once again the
overall effect is ambiguous and depends on the conviction distribution.
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If punishment is concave or linear, the steady state distribution of DMs by number
of convictions slopes down. For x0 >xl9 the crime cut-off b* (x) increases for states x
that are less populated than the states at which the cut-off decreases. If increases and
decreases were of the same size, and F(-) were uniform in the relevant range, crime
would unambiguously increase. But neither of these conditions holds, and so even with
the steady state assumption the overall impact is ambiguous. For x0 <xl9 the crime
decreases occur in more populated states than the crime increases, but the magnitudes of
the changes in b* (x) work in the opposite direction.
Notice that both the effects of changes in a and changes in P(-) are ambiguous
even though DMs are risk neutral. From (3) it is clear that in the Becker one-shot model
if p = 0, all that matters for risk neutral DMs is the product (1 -a)p(x). Thus empirical
findings of greater elasticity of crime with respect to (1 - a ) than with respect top(x)
have been taken as evidence that criminals, at least on the margin, are risk-loving. (See
Becker 1968; Ehrlich 1975, 1977; Wolpin 1978)
In a dynamic context, however, these empirical findings are not inconsistent with
risk-neutral criminals (or even risk-averse ones).
15
6. CONCLUSION
Repeated decision problems are qualitatively different from one-shot decision
problems. Thus empirical work based on the one-shot model runs a high risk of being
misleading. Longitudinal analysis is the natural and least dangerous way to study the
incentives for criminal behavior.
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Proof of Proposition 1:
(a) This part is essentially algebra. To save notation, I will omit the parameters










(1 - q)[V{x +1) - V(x)] = — p(x);
v VJL K J K n
 1 _ a _ p ^ v
a n d so
00 j * , x
V(x)= \ {b-(\-a) W—}dF(b) + (\-q)V(x)
^ 1 — a — R
-a-p





= (1 - </)F(*) + \ (b-b* (x))dF(b) - p W .
. . . . 1-a-B
Then
1-a - p
- V(x +1)] + J[ft - b* (x)]dF(b) - j[b - b* (x + \)]dF(b)
b* b\x+\)
\b\x)-b\x + l)]
= -p(x) + - K—^--G(b (x),b
l pl-a-p l-a-p l-a-p
Substituting this expression in (2) yields (5).
(b) To prove existence, uniqueness, and differentiability, it is easiest to prove
these properties for the value function V(-[). Existence, uniqueness, and differentiability
for b* (•]•) then follow from (2).
Consider the transform Uqa^ defined by
UgaMx)=max { \{b-(l-a)p(x) + (\-q)[(\-a)u(x + \) +au(x)]}dF(b)
s J
bes
+ J{-fip(x) + (1 -q)[Mx +1) + (1" P)u(x)]}dF(b)}-
bis
To save notation in this section, I will supress the subscripts on U. It is clear that if u is a
continuous and differentiable function of x,^,a,p then Uu is a continuous and
differentiable function x,q,a,$ also. Hence all that remains to be shown is that Uisa
contraction mapping.
Use the sup norm:
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u2 (x +1) + (1 - P)a2 (x)]}dF(b)
bis.
where s2 denotes the set that maximizes value with u2. The inequality follows because
Uui(x) is at least as great as value constrained to be in s2. The right-hand side of this
inequality simplifies to
Uux (x) - Uu2 (x) < (1 - q){[ux (x +1) - u2 (x +1)][(1 - a ) jdF(b) + P (1 - \dF(b)]
s2 s2
+[ux(x) - u2(x)][a jdF(b) + (1 - p)(l - jdF(b)]}
s2 s2
where the expression in curly brackets is just a weighted average of
and
[ux(x)-u2(x)]
and (\-q) <\. Thus
19
\\Uux,Uu2\\<
and so Uis a contraction mapping. QED.
Proof of Proposition 2:
Consider the transform 7 a^p defined by
(6)
PM*) + M* +1) - (1 - a - f>)G(u(x), u(x +1))}.
To save notation in this section, I will supress the subscripts on T. From (3) and
proposition l(b), b * (-|-) is the unique fixed point of T. Thus to show that b * (-|-) is
decreasing in x, it suffices to show that if w(-) is decreasing, so is 7w(-). The smae for
increasing and constant. I will confine the proof to part (a). Proof of parts (b) and (c) is
so similar as to be obvious.
Suppose then that P is concave and u(x) is decreasing. Then
dTu(x) ..
 n. .. . .. .(du(x).. . .. du(x + Y) ,
ox ox
where
cu(x) = PF(M(JC)) + (1 - a ) ( l - F(u(x))) > 0
is the unconditional probability of being convicted this period if you have x convictions
and will accept ^  criminal opportunity b if and only if b ^  u(x). Since p} (x) is negative




Hence for all x9q,a,$,b*(x\q,a9$) is decreasing in JC.
For the second claim, we use the following:
Lemma 1:
If P is concave, V(x\q,a,$) is an increasing function of*.
Proof of lemma:
Use the transform [/from the proof of proposition 1, and suppose u(x) is
increasing in JC.
dUuW = f[_(i - a )//(*) + (1 - q)[(\ -a)w'(jc +1) + au'(x)]]dF(b)
dx
 bt
P^'(JC) + (1 - q)[$u\x +1) + (1 - f>)u'(x)]dF(b) > 0
where we can ignore changes in the bounds of integration by the envelope theorem, and
the inequality follows because all terms are positive. QED.
From the lemma, then
V(x)-V(x + l)<0
and so from (2)
the Becker one-shot criterion. QED.





But if P is bounded
lim
X—> p(x) = 0
and so since b*(x\) is by construction nonnegative, the corollary follows. QED.
Proof of Proposition 3:
Consider the transform
Let q -» 0
^o
T
,aAx) = (l~ P)«W + P"(* +1) - (1 - a - P)G(«(jc),ii(x +1)).
The fixed point for the limit transform is any constant function. Hence by continuity
b* (x\q,a, P)must be arbitrarily close to a constant function for q sufficiently close to
zero. By the corollary to proposition 2, the only constant function that can behave
appropriately for arbitrarily large x is
b*(x\q,a,?>) = 0. QED.
Proof of Proposition 4:
From (6)
22
-*%- = -qp(x) + (1 - q)[-u(x) + u(x +1) - G(i/(*), «(* +1))]
ap
which is always negative if u(x) is a decreasing function. Consider the fixed point b* (-|-)
of this transformation. From proposition 2 it is a decreasing function on the right-hand
side of this equation; hence
But since Tga^b* =b*, the proposition follows. QED.
Proof of Proposition 5:
For any function v(x,a,P) define
A(v)(x,a,P) = — - — - .
5p da
Let u(x) be a decreasing function. Then
A(7;ap«)(x,a, P) = (1 - q){[~u(x) + u(x +1) - G(u(x),u{x +1)] + G(u(x),u(x +1)}
= (1-?)[-!/(*)+ i/(* + l)]<0.
At the fixed point
A(7;apZ>*)(x,a,P) = D(x\q,a,f>) < 0. QED.
Proof of Proposition 6:
Let w(x) be a strictly decreasing function. Define
23
Q,U N =min Kjyuy*,),uy*TL))
x
 G(i/(x),i/(* + l))+ /?(*)
Since u(x) is strictly decreasing, Q(u)>0 and clearly £?(")< 1 (since p(x)>0 for some x.
Since
+ (1 - q)G(u(x),u(x +1)),
da
> 0 for all q < Q{u).
da
Consider the mapping 7^ p u = TQ{u)a^. It is easy to see that this is a contraction
mapping, since the proof of proposition 1 relied only on q<l, not any particular value of
q. So 7^*p has a fixed point vap and
* (\*But then b (x\q ,oc,p) = vap solves (6) and
db\x\q,a,V)
da
> 0 for all <?<,?•. QED.
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